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Background: The usage of patient data for research poses risks concerning the patients’ privacy and informational
self-determination. Next-generation-sequencing technologies and various other methods gain data from
biospecimen, both for translational research and personalized medicine. If these biospecimen are anonymized,
individual research results from genomic research, which should be offered to patients in a clinically relevant
timeframe, cannot be associated back to the individual. This raises an ethical concern and challenges the legitimacy
of anonymized patient samples. In this paper we present a new approach which supports both data privacy and
the possibility to give feedback to patients about their individual research results.
Methods: We examined previously published privacy concepts regarding a streamlined de-pseudonymization
process and a patient-based pseudonym as applicable to research with genomic data and warehousing
approaches. All concepts identified in the literature review were compared to each other and analyzed for their
applicability to translational research projects. We evaluated how these concepts cope with challenges implicated
by personalized medicine. Therefore, both person-centricity issues and a separation of pseudonymization and
de-pseudonymization stood out as a central theme in our examination. This motivated us to enhance an existing
pseudonymization method regarding a separation of duties.
Results: The existing concepts rely on external trusted third parties, making de-pseudonymization a multistage
process involving additional interpersonal communication, which might cause critical delays in patient care.
Therefore we propose an enhanced method with an asymmetric encryption scheme separating the duties of
pseudonymization and de-pseudonymization. The pseudonymization service provider is unable to conclude the
patient identifier from the pseudonym, but assigns this ability to an authorized third party (ombudsman) instead. To
solve person-centricity issues, a collision-resistant function is incorporated into the method. These two facts
combined enable us to address essential challenges in translational research. A productive software prototype was
implemented to prove the functionality of the suggested translational, data privacy-preserving method. Eventually,
we performed a threat analysis to evaluate potential hazards connected with this pseudonymization method.
Conclusions: The proposed method offers sustainable organizational simplification regarding an ethically indicated,
but secure and controlled process of de-pseudonymizing patients. A pseudonym is patient-centered to allow
correlating separate datasets from one patient. Therefore, this method bridges the gap between bench and
bedside in translational research while preserving patient privacy. Assigned ombudsmen are able to
de-pseudonymize a patient, if an individual research result is clinically relevant.
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Next generation sequencing methods
Next generation sequencing methods have provided a
wealth of new possibilities for the characterization of
tumors in individual patients and laid the basis for new
treatment options. However, under certain circum-
stances, the nature of the obtained data poses new
risks to data privacy [1,2]. Patients that provide sam-
ples within translational research projects at the Na-
tional Center for Tumor Diseases (NCT) Heidelberg
therefore sign a specific informed consent accounting
this risk. The consent specifically addresses the issue of
data privacy, which would not be as critical, if the bio-
logical specimen were anonymized for sequencing and
further analysis. However, translational research and
personalized medicine ultimately require a two-way in-
formation highway from bench to bedside and vice
versa [3,4]. Conducting research with anonymized data
excludes the possibility of retrospective linkage to clin-
ically relevant information, which is a fundamental am-
bition in biomedical translational research [3]. Without
the possibility to de-pseudonymize a patient, he or she
would be deprived of a direct benefit from research re-
sults. This is an ethical challenge, as under certain cir-
cumstances, individual research results in genetic and
genomic research might lead to new treatment possi-
bilities and therefore should be offered to study partici-
pants in a clinically relevant timeframe [5]. In a
scenario where clinical follow-up data is later added to
a biological sample to study outcome effects, ano-
nymization is not applicable either. Furthermore, per-
sonalized medicine has to be based on the careful
analysis of multifaceted data. By their very design next-
generation-sequencing technologies and other high-
throughput methods imply the involvement of many
different persons and even external organizations in
the data collection and analysis process, with all the
corresponding additional risks to patient privacy [2,6].
To retain a semantic reference between patient and
sample, while still complying with data privacy require-
ments, pseudonymization is the method of choice
[7,8]. What we need is a data protection and privacy
concept with solid pseudonymization and a stream-
lined de-pseudonymization process to transfer the re-
sults back to the clinic [9].
Identity management
One prerequisite for pseudonymization is identity man-
agement. Current hospital information systems and clin-
ical registries use patient registration modules which
assign a unique patient identifier (PID) to a patient to
constitute a mature identity management. This is a man-
ual and elaborate task. Faldum et. al. [10] introduced an
algorithm for automatic PID generation with optimalproperties for error detection and correction which
semi-automates identity management.
If hospital caregivers send biological samples and
medical data to a sample processing lab (SPL) and a
sequencing facility for genetic analysis, biospecimen
like blood and tissue are annotated with contextual in-
formation like project name, tissue source site, sample,
or study participant. Working with personal data is
neither necessary nor acceptable at a SPL (although
patients may have consented to processing of personal
data where needed). Hence, a pseudonym (PSN) in-
stead of personal data or the PID should be attached
to a sample forwarded to a SPL. Consequently, a PID
must be transformed into a PSN before a sample and
its associated data leave the hospital for outside pro-
cessing. This PSN must be repetitively unambiguous
for a patient, so that researchers can correlate and
utilize for secondary use several samples from the
same patient (e.g. tumor and control sample). Add-
itionally, there is a requirement for one or several per-
sons who are able to compute back the PID from the
PSN. These persons are called ombudsmen, because
they safeguard the privacy of the patients while they
are still able to identify them individually from a
pseudonym, if necessary.
Unambiguous pseudonyms
If record linkage at the research site is made with a
pseudonym derived from a mature and stable PID,
imprecision is low and error-tolerant record linkage
mechanisms requiring personal information such as
names and birthdates [11] are not needed. From a
privacy point of view record linkage with a PSN is
better than record linkage with personal information
or a PID. For a controlled on demand aggregation of
clinical data with translational data it must be possible
to repetitively generate the identical PSN from a PID
contained in the clinical data. Therefore, pseudonym
generation must be repetitively unambiguous for all
data sources [12]. If this requirement is fulfilled, a
data warehouse for translational research objectives
with records linked by a PSN can be considered
[3,13,14].
Duty separation of pseudonymization and de-
pseudonymization
The person that pseudonymizes a patient’s sample is not
necessarily the same person that performs the de-
pseudonymization of the patient. Thus, a separation of
duties regarding pseudonymization and de-pseudony
mization will simplify the process. It is practical and rea-
sonable to have one pseudonymization service provider
and one or more flexibly chosen ombudsmen for de-
pseudonymization tasks.
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Generally speaking, the two core requirements for com-
prehensive pseudonymization in translational research
are a repetitively unambiguous PSN for a given PID and
a separation of duties regarding pseudonymization and
de-pseudonymization of a patient. If warranted, ombuds-
men should be able to de-pseudonymize a patient by a
given PSN in a streamlined manner without further hu-
man interaction. An unambiguous PSN is essential to in-
vestigate correlations between phenotype and genotype
of a patient.
In this paper we introduce a pseudonymization method
which supports these core requirements of translational
research. In addition, we present a software tool based on
this method which is used in translational research pro-
jects at the NCT Heidelberg.
Methods
We analyzed previously published pseudonymization
approaches to evaluate whether or not they fulfill trans-
lational research requirements. In the process, we took
characteristics of pseudonymization methods from the
literature and used them to qualify the different ap-
proaches. These characteristics specifically address un-
ambiguity of the pseudonyms and de-pseudonymization
possibilities, which are the two core properties of
pseudonymization for translational research. Given the
characteristics, we arranged the different pseudonymi
zation approaches into a table for a comparison of their
features. Based on this feature matrix we constructed a
method that possesses all desired characteristics displayed
in the table and eventually implemented a prototype using
the scripting language PHP and a Microsoft© SQL Server
as database to prove the technical feasibility of this new
method.
Literature review
A PubMed database search revealed 10 hits for the key-
word “pseudonymization” and 16 hits for the British
English variant “pseudonymisation” (the search covered
all database fields and was performed in August 2012).
No duplicate records were found in all 26 documents,
thus all documents found were screened for applicabil-
ity. Six pseudonymization methods were identified and
will be briefly presented below.
Comparison of different pseudonymization approaches
To compare the different pseudonymization methods,
we need to define the terms pseudonymization and de-
pseudonymization. This is necessary, because the various
approaches were initially developed for different scena-
rios and thus differ in their preconditions. For structural
equality, we define the PID as a patient-identifying
item to be able to compare two-step with single-steppseudonymization methods. Concerning de-pseudony
mization, we define the following scenario: an ombuds-
man is a person independent from the pseudonymization
process who wants to de-pseudonymize a patient (i.e. find
out the PID from a given PSN). With this definition we
can compare how many additional parties the ombuds-
man has to contact for a successful de-pseudonymization.
Methodology by Neubauer et al.
Neubauer et al. present a methodology for the pseudony
mization of medical data [15-17]. Their methodology
makes it possible to reestablish the relationship between a
patient and her/his samples by an authorized user. An
authorized user can create sets of PSNs, so-called shared
PSNs, to connect patients to samples for research pur-
poses. While providing perfect patient privacy, this
method implies assigning a new PSN to every sample of a
patient. This fact prevents the reuse of the PSN to inte-
grate bedside and biology and to bridge the gap between
clinical care and medical research in a patient-centric
manner [3]. The methodology of Neubauer et al. is a very
innovative concept to control authentication, authori-
zation and access to medical data and provides perfect
privacy, but lacks an unambiguous pseudonymization
transformation of a patient identifier for secondary use. It
would need to be added to their methodology to fulfill
translational research requirements.
Method by Noumeir et al.
Noumeir et al. define two types of pseudonymization [18]:
pseudonymization with one-way pseudonyms (which can-
not be reversed) and reversible pseudonymization. One-
way pseudonyms are applicable for translational research
with a specific scientific question. They are not appropri-
ate, however, if personalized treatment decisions based on
systematic or incidental findings [5] are considered.
Therefore one-way pseudonyms are not analyzed in this
manuscript. Reversible pseudonymization, though, offers
the possibility of re-identification by either mapping tables
or mapping functions. As this mapping has to be secured,
Noumeir et al. propose a symmetric encryption scheme.
As a matter of fact, re-identification has to be restricted by
either hardware/technical or organizational measures as
the IT system implementing the method can both encrypt
and decrypt the mapping information. This permits out-
sourcing of the pseudonymization service although it has
to be combined with exhaustive legal provisions prescri-
bing which ombudsman is authorized to de-pseudonymize
which patients. The service provider then has to refer to
the contract for every single de-pseudonymization request,
providing documented evidence that the requester is enti-
tled to de-pseudonymize the patient from the given
pseudonym. This turns de-pseudonymization into a com-
plex and bureaucratic process with human interaction.
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Pommerening et al. present a method for the pseudony
mization of patient samples which is generally accepted
among German data privacy advocates [19,20]. The
method is called “the pseudonymous research database”
or “model B of the generic data privacy concept of the
TMF e. V.” [20]. The method involves two service providers
called trusted third parties (TTPs), who act as service pro-
viders and are employed for both, pseudonymization and
de-pseudonymization of the patient. Pommerening et al.
do not consider the PID a patient-identifying item like we
do. They define patient identifying data (IDAT), from
which a PID is derived by TTP1 (first pseudonymization).
From the PID, a PSN is derived by TTP2 (second
pseudonymization). We have translated their terminology
(IDAT → PID → PSN) into our terminology (PID →
PSN1 → PSN2) to facilitate comparison of their method
with the other methods (see Figure 1). Their method al-
lows reuse of the PSN for further research as described by
Prokosch et al. [3], because only one pseudonym (PSN2)
is assigned per patient. The method can also be applied to
research data exported from a single source information
system for patient care and research [21]. Nevertheless the
de-pseudonymization of a patient requested by an autho-
rized ombudsman involves two additional parties (TTP1,Figure 1 Pseudonymization methods. The five applicable pseudonymiza
Their functional principles are simplified for faster perception.TTP2) with human interaction and thus appears difficult
to organize as a swift routine de-pseudonymization
process.
Method by De Moor et al.
De Moor et al. emphasize the role of a TTP for
pseudonymization [22-25]. They identify the threat of an
unauthorized re-identification by dictionary attacks and
therefore introduce a pre-pseudonymization step pre-
ceding the pseudonymization by a TTP. This approach
differs from the method of Pommerening et al. in having
the data provider rather than another TTP perform the
pre-pseudonymization. This also simplifies the entire
process, because only one TTP instead of two is needed
for pseudonymization. Still, de-pseudonymization of a pa-
tient by an authorized ombudsman requires two additional
parties: the TTP and the data provider that performed the
pre-pseudonymization step.
Method by Elger et al.
Elger et al. [26,27] define two reversible pseudonymization
techniques: reversible single-pass and reversible dual-pass.
The reversible dual-pass technique uses two pseudonymization
steps to safeguard patient privacy and therefore corre-
sponds to the methods proposed by Pommerening et al.tion methods which were identified in a PubMed database search.
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allows de-pseudonymization in a single step and, while
being more straightforward, requires additional security
measures, such as symmetric or asymmetric encryption,
when compared to the double-pass technique. The
authors identify asymmetric encryption as a technique
that allows for a separation of duties concerning pseudo
nymization and de-pseudonymization. Nevertheless, their
proposed pseudonymization method implements a sym-
metric encryption with a key for each clinic taking part in
their research project. Their method is similar to the
method by Noumeir et al. but due to clinic-specific keys
their de-pseudonymization process can be organized with
less bureaucratic hassle. This is achieved by enabling each
clinic, apart from the pseudonymization service provider,
to de-pseudonymize their patients through their clinic-
specific key.
Epidemiological method by Pommerening et al.
The pseudonymization procedure for German epidemio-
logical cancer registries by Pommerening et al. defines a
concept for data flow and storage for population-based
cancer registries [28]. A trusted office (TTP1) receives pa-
tient identifying data (IDAT) plus payload data and gener-
ates a patient identifier (PID). This PID and the payload
data are then sent to a registration office (TTP2) which
generates a pseudonym (PSN) from the PID and stores it
with the data. We translate the terminology of this method
(IDAT → PID → PSN) into our terminology (PID →
PSN1→ PSN2). The trusted office (TTP1) simultaneously
encrypts the IDAT with an asymmetric key and sends the
cipher along with PSN1 to a supervising office (OMB).
This supervising office has the private key for decryp-
tion, hence is the ombudsman in our terminology. This
way, the powers of de-pseudonymization are separated
between the registration office (TTP2) and the supervis-
ing office (OMB). The supervising office (OMB) cannot
directly de-pseudonymize a person with a given PSN2.
It has to request computation of the PSN1 from the
registration office (TTP2) first, as this is the only way to
reveal the PID.
Methods characteristics comparison
Except for the methodology by Neubauer et al. all
methods presented above are suitable for personalized on-
cology research programs as they perform pseudonymization
and fulfill data privacy requirements. Elger et al.
define two characteristics to distinguish between dif-
ferent pseudonymization techniques:
– First: Pseudonymization can be computed back
(=reversible) or not (=one-way).
– Second: Pseudonymization is performed once
(=single-pass) or twice (=dual-pass).Taking de-pseudonymization into account, further
characteristics have to be added:
– Can the duties of de-pseudonymization and
pseudonymization be separated?
– How many additional parties must be contacted for
de-pseudonymization?
Separation is not possible with symmetric encryption
schemes (duty-united), while asymmetric encryption schemes
do allow a separation of duties [26]. A party different from the
pseudonymization service provider can be appointed to de-
pseudonymize a patient from a pseudonym (duty-separated).
None of the presented methods perform a reversible
pseudonymization in combination with a direct duty-
separated de-pseudonymization by a party other than the
pseudonymization service provider (see Table 1). The au-
thors therefore propose a new pseudonymization method
with an asymmetric encryption scheme: the reversible
single- or dual-pass pseudonymization method combined




In order to streamline pseudonymization in translational
research projects, we suggest a pseudonymization tech-
nique with duty-separated de-pseudonymization of the
patient carried out directly by dedicated, named om-
budsmen. This can be achieved using an asymmetric en-
cryption scheme (see Figure 2).
We start with the pseudonymization procedure. The
operations carried out by the TTP for a pseudonymization
are shown in Figure 3. When the pseudonymization ser-
vice receives a PID, it first computes deterministic one-
way mapping information (DOWMAP) for a PID.
After that the operating mode of the pseudonymization
service branches into two scenarios. In case of an initial
PID pseudonymization, a handy pseudonym (PSN) is gen-
erated. In case of a repeated pseudonymization, the PSN
can be retrieved from the database. Once the PSN is avail-
able, it is possible to encrypt the PID multiple times with
the public keys of different ombudsmen allowing each of
them to de-pseudonymize the patient with his or her own
private key.
The computation of DOWMAP needs close attention.
One could suggest using an encrypted PID directly as a
pseudonym, but this approach causes a determination
problem: Encryption algorithms generally produce differ-
ent ciphers when used repeatedly on the same given
input. This circumstance is illustrated in Figure 4. This
problem applies to all encryption algorithms approved
under the Technical Directive TR-03116 for eCard pro-
jects of the German Federal Government [29] and
Table 1 Characteristics of the different pseudonymization methods












needed for a de-
pseudonymization?
Neubauer et al. X - X X X n.a.
Noumeir et al. X X X - - 1
Pommerening
et al.
X X - X - 2
De Moor et al. X X - X - 2
Elger et al. X X X - - 1
epidemiological X X - X (X)* 1
translational X X X (X)** X 0
* power-separated, but not duty-separated.
** not realized in our project.
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ing, all symmetric and asymmetric encryption operations
performed in a block cipher mode with additional en-
tropy (e.g. initialization vector) produce different ciphers
for the same given input. Solely the Electronic Code
Book (ECB) mode does not add additional entropy andFigure 2 Logical concept of translational pseudonymization. The idea
pseudonymization. Therefore, nobody but the keeper of a corresponding stherefore always produces the same cipher on a given in-
put. This is the very reason why ECB mode is considered
less secure and why it is not approved under TR-03116.
For our translational research scenario we need one sin-
gle deterministic and distinct pseudonym per patient
which can be applied to clinical data for secondary useis to use an asymmetric encryption scheme within the
ecret private key can de-pseudonymize a patient.
Figure 3 The translational pseudonymization algorithm. The algorithm has two scenarios. Either a new pseudonym is created or the patient
has been pseudonymized before and his pseudonym is retrieved from the database.
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proved methods, we chose not to use an unambiguously
encrypted PID in ECB mode as a directly-derived
pseudonym.
Instead, we chose an elaborate procedure to compute the
deterministic one-way mapping information (DOWMAP).Figure 4 The determination problem with approved encryption algor
secure, pseudorandom initialization vector which renders ambiguous the r
Therefore, it cannot be used directly to create an unambiguous pseudonymThe most straightforward DOWMAP would be a Keyed-
Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [30]. HMAC
incorporates a cryptographic key [31] to secure against dic-
tionary attacks. A better DOWMAP is the “Password-
Based Key Derivation Function 2” (PBKDF2) [32], as it adds
entropy (called salt) and a computing effort (called iterationithms. Approved encryption algorithms utilize a cryptographically
esulting cipher of the encryption operation of a distinct input.
.
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creases the computing cost for an insider dictionary attack
in a linear way and can make attacks with rainbow tables
[33,34] uneconomical. We apply the PBKDF2 with a deter-
ministic salt (HMAC of the PID) to address the determin-
ation problem in obtaining a Derived Key (DK) which
constitutes our DOWMAP (see Figure 5). Subsequently, we
generate a shorter, more user-friendly pseudonym (PSN)
for better practicability in the lab.
For de-pseudonymization, an ombudsman should use a
client software application. This allows keeping the private
key of the ombudsman - the primary aim for attackers –
local. With a client application, the ombudsman exclu-
sively communicates his public key (certificate) and the
relevant PSN to the pseudonymization service provider
(TTP). If the TTP does have a corresponding encrypted
PID, it is automatically transferred to the ombudsman.
With her/his private key the ombudsman may then de-
crypt the encrypted PID using his local application. The
ombudsman thus only keeps and safeguards her/his pri-
vate key and does not have to manage a list of PID-PSNFigure 5 The technical solution for the determination problem. Deter
unambiguously determine, if a patient has been pseudonymized before. Th
encryption. Asymmetric encryption is performed after this mapping step.relations, which are stored by the pseudonymization ser-
vice provider (TTP). Since the PID is asymmetrically
encrypted, these relations are useless for everybody but
the ombudsman.
Pseudonymization service for the NCT trial center
A functional software service was programmed to prove
the technical feasibility of this new translational pseudo
nymization method. It is in production use for 28 trans-
lational research projects at the Heidelberg Center for
Personalized Oncology. These projects stretch across
various cancer types (acute myeloid leukemia, multiple
myeloma, lung cancer, glioblastoma, gastric cancer,
mammary carcinoma, soft tissue sarcoma, head- and
neck squamous cell carcinoma, melanoma, pancreatic
cancer and some more) and have different patient
cohort sizes ranging from a handful up to several hun-
dreds. The service is implemented in PHP, a scripting
language which can be embedded into HTML and is
interpreted by a hypertext preprocessor. It supports
object-oriented programming and can be combinedministic One-Way Mapping Information (DOWMAP) is used to
is is accomplished with cryptographic hashing and symmetric
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in reliable clinical applications, such as drug informa-
tion systems [35]. A Microsoft© SQL Server was chosen
as database, but thanks to a database abstraction layer
most relational database management systems are
supported.
The service is used for translational research projects
in Heidelberg. Loss of an ombudsman’s key or PIN ren-
ders de-pseudonymization virtually impossible. As our
method enables us to have more than one cryptographic
public key, we appointed an institutional review board as
a “backup ombudsman” in addition to various project-
specific ombudsmen. Typically, the principal investigator
(PI) of a project serves as an ombudsman. After insti-
tutional authentication, authorized users access the
pseudonymization service through a web-based interface.
Either single sample pseudonymization (see Figure 6) orFigure 6 The software prototype – single sample pseudonymization r
Selection of a research project controls which ombudsmen are able to de-
comprehensive barcode for sample storage management within a “Labora
authentication screen are also visible on the screenshot.batch pseudonymization with a spreadsheet upload func-
tion are available. Batch sizes are limited to minimize the
risk of security issues with malicious service abuse. The
service’s authentication mechanism relies on the “Light-
weight Directory Access Protocol” (LDAP) querying the
institutional domain server. Against service abuse, a “Re-
verse Turing Test” RTT is performed by the “Completely
Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and
Humans Apart” (CAPTCHA), developed by Ahn, Blum
and Langford [36]. In our specific prototype it displays
random characters in a graphic that can’t be interpreted
by a machine. The simplest way of pseudonymization in
our prototype is to generate an accompanying ticket with a
barcode containing the patient’s pseudonym (see Figure 7).
This ticket can be printed out and sent to the sample pro-
cessing lab with a biospecimen. Batch-pseudonymization
with spreadsheets is available for pseudonymization ofequest. The PID is the only input to create or retrieve a pseudonym.
pseudonymize a patient. Other inputs are used to generate a
tory Information Management System” (LIMS). The CAPTCHA and the
Figure 7 The software prototype – single sample pseudonymization result. The pseudonymization service creates an accompanying ticket
that can be printed out and attached to a patient sample. The ticket contains the patient’s pseudonym and a sample barcode used at the sample
processing lab as an identifier for the LIMS. The LIMS is used to document storage, processing and quality control of the samples according to
common good laboratory practice (GLP).
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sue bank for a specific research project.
Discussion
Our method to pseudonymize patient identifiers offers a
separation of duties for pseudonymization and de-
pseudonymization and generates a repetitively unam-
biguous pseudonym for a patient. We combined these
two features to address specific requirements in transla-
tional research projects. It is difficult to balance data
privacy protection rights with a patient’s right to learn
about individual research results. In the end, any transla-
tional research sample needs a unique, patient-centric
identifier. The person gaining the sample, the research
project and the scientific objectives each determine the
point when any identifier is applied to a patient’s sample.
Our method offers a global solution for repetitively unam-
biguous pseudonymization of this identifier for the purpose
of translational research. The duty of de-pseudonymization
can then be handed over to an independent party. Patients
participating in a translational research project will have to
accept the direct de-pseudonymization option [5]. Actual
de-pseudonymization will require more than just notifyingthe treating physician. All data of the case will have to be
discussed at a molecular tumor board comprising clini-
cians, bioinformaticians and the principal investigators of
the research projects affected. The board will then suggest
options for the patient and support the clinician in
interpreting the results for the patient. To prepare for eth-
ically indicated de-pseudonymization or key loss, the fol-
lowing entities should be considered for the role of
ombudsmen: institutional review boards, ethics commit-
tees or data security officers. Before her/his assignment,
any ombudsman has to undergo scrutiny to ascertain that
she/he fulfills legal requirements. Under German stan-
dards, for instance, a doctor would qualify as an ombuds-
man, if he is treating patients in a translational research
program with a corresponding informed consent.
From a mathematics and information theory point of
view, a pseudonymization transformation should be an
injective or at least collision-resistant function. The need
to protect mapping information makes any technique
other than a cryptographic function largely unlikely.
Therefore, the authors of this article deliberately chose
to evaluate encryption, decryption and cryptographic
one-way-functions only. This is not meant to imply that
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imagination.
Field report on pseudonymization and de-
pseudonymization activities
The usability of the NCT pseudonymization service is
acceptable, because users do not need a separate user-
name and password, but may authenticate themselves
with their institutional login and password. The pseu
donymization of single biospecimen after surgery or
blood withdrawal works fine and happens on an inci-
dental basis. A pseudonymization receipt with a barcode is
printed out and used to document the sample processing
and storage. Working with a barcode scanner eliminates
manual documentation errors. For batches, the Sample
Processing Lab (SPL) uses a sample submission spread-
sheet. Once it is filled out by the principal investigator of
the project, it can be uploaded to the pseudonymization
service for batch pseudonymization. The resulting submis-
sion sheet with pseudonyms (text and barcode) is printed
out for further processing and storage documentation
according to good laboratory practice (GLP).
Ethically or medically indicated de-pseudonymization has
not taken place so far, but successful de-pseudonymization
was performed by a principal investigator. This was done
due to suspected manual confusion of two samples during
entry into the sample submission sheet. In order to track
the entire submission process, the investigator, among
other measures, de-pseudonymized the pseudonyms
for the two samples. He was able to reconstruct the
pseudonymization process and to verify the right rela-
tion between patients and samples. The NCT Trials Of-
fice as a service provider would not have noticed the
activity, if they had not checked the audit logs of the
pseudonymization service (“User X has performed the
de-pseudonymization of patient with pseudonym Y”).
This shows that both pseudonymization and de-pseudo
nymization processes will function without technical sup-
port from the service provider. These are our experiences
so far and some ombudsmen are excited that they now
have obtained an asymmetric key pair which is used analo-
gous to secure e-mail exchange (S/MIME).
If a researcher makes a finding that could possibly
indicate a de-pseudonymization, the subsequent steps are
defined by a Workgroup called “Ethical and Legal Aspects
of Whole Genome Sequencing” (EURAT). EURAT is a
project on normative issues of total genome sequencing
that brings together scholars from Heidelberg University,
the Heidelberg University Hospital, the German Cancer
Research Center (DKFZ), the European Molecular Biology
Laboratory (EMBL), the Max Planck Institute for Com-
parative Public Law and International Law and the Re-
search Center for Health Economics at the Hannover
University [37]. Primary results of the workgroup are acodex for non-clinical researchers and two templates for
patient information and informed consents. Also a process
for de-pseudonymization in case of normal or incidental
findings is defined. If a researcher has a finding, he can
hand it over to an interdisciplinary board. Depending on
the finding the researcher can choose between the “board
for normal findings” and the “board for incidental, add-
itional, or difficult findings”. The board discusses the case
and decides whether the de-pseudonymization will be
performed or not. If yes, the ombudsman performs the
de-pseudonymization and then matches the PID with the
name of the patient and his treating physician. The
treating physician or alternatively a board member gets in-
formed by the ombudsman and then can deliver the re-
sults to the patient. In case the board needs additional
clinical information from the patient to reach a decision,
the ombudsman gathers this information in cooperation
with the treating physician. That is especially why the om-
budsman plays an important role in our translational
pseudonymization method. Of course, all persons involved
into the process are required to observe strict confidential-
ity and data protection.
Limitations
Encryption of the medical payload data is not imple-
mented in our software prototype. The asymmetric en-
cryption scheme we use implies a high computational
cost. Therefore, symmetric schemes for encryption of the
payload data appear more reasonable, especially for large
quantities of data (big data). In addition, genetic data bears
an inherent re-identification risk [1,2]. This could be
addressed with a symmetric cryptographic approach as
proposed by Cassa et al. [38]. In general, access to genetic
data has to be secured by appropriate authentication and
authorization methods to control the inherent re-iden
tification risk.
Alternatively, our method could be incorporated or
combined with a comprehensive health data manage-
ment concept like the one presented by Neubauer
et al. [17] to provide encryption of the medical pay-
load data. However, this would require nationwide
availability of an electronic health card infrastructure
and health care professional cards. This is currently
not the case in Germany and other countries, but
planned for the future.
In our translational research projects, patient identities
are managed within the Heidelberg university hospital in-
formation system. A multi-center translational research
project will require an identity management system super-
ior to that of a hospital information system. Multi-center
identity management and pseudonymization could be
made available by combining the methods and concepts
that Faldum and Pommerening propose [10] with our
translational pseudonymization method.
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mization in our project, but we plan to upgrade our tech-
nique to pseudonymize with a dual-pass method similar
to the ones Pommerening et al. and De Moor et al.
propose (see Figure 8). That would address large pro-
jects with extraordinary safeguards. Such projects are
for example large distributed long-term projects with
biobanking, several institutions involved, clinical data
warehouses, and personalized medicine genome se-
quencing projects. The benefits would be a reversible,
repetitively unambiguous, dual-pass pseudonymization
which still allows appointed ombudsmen to directly
de-pseudonymize a patient. Combined with a sustained
consent management and defined de-pseudonymization
processes this is a promising approach. In a two-step set-
ting, the first pseudonymization step will be performed by
the clinical sample gainer who then tags the biological
sample with the first PSN. The researcher receiving the
sample then performs the second pseudonymization step
to obtain the second PSN for research. The burden of
pseudonymizing a sample twice results in informational
separation of powers and therefore enhanced data privacy.
The first PSN serves as feedback code for the sampleFigure 8 Logical concept of translational dual-pass pseudonymization
third parties is combined with a separation of duties regarding a direct de-gainer who knows the patients’ identity and labels the
sample. The second PSN is applied by the researcher re-
ceiving the sample and can be disclosed to colleagues
working in the research context with the sample.
Pseudonymization alone does not eliminate the need
to define an appropriate access policy to the bulk of
research data [39]. Data propagation and aggregation
with external data sources always bears a re-iden
tification risk. The principal investigator of a research
project has to weigh the protection of personal health
information against the option to join the data with other
data sources through a pseudonym. Fullerton and Lee
propose a data access committee or similar internal over-
sight body with suitable stakeholder representation to sup-
port the principal investigator in assessing the risk-to-
benefit ratio of data linkage [40]. Institutional review
boards or ethics committees are another instrument to as-
sist in the decision, whether such data conflation is ethical
and justifiable.
Threat analysis for the method and its software prototype
A threat analysis was performed to evaluate the possibil-
ities and risks for unauthorized re-identification of a. The informational separation of powers achieved with two trusted
pseudonymization by authorized ombudsmen.
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pseudonymization method have been identified:
 Database theft
 System or hardware theft
 Social engineering
 Malicious service use
 Malicious insiders
Database theft has no negative impact, because any de-
terministic mapping information is secured by the secret
key of the pseudonymization service provider. The only
information visible to the attacker in plaintext is which
and how many pseudonyms have been created. Even a
cryptanalysis will not yield any output, because the
cryptographic keys are not available to the attacker.
A system or hardware theft is a serious threat. The se-
cret key of the pseudonymization service provider and
all data from the database would be vulnerable to a dic-
tionary attack. A dictionary attack with lookup or rain-
bow tables [33] can be rendered uneconomical by
applying a deterministic salt to the HMAC. The comput-
ing cost of a dictionary attack by an insider with the se-
cret key can only be controlled in a linear way, e.g. by
applying the PBKDF2 function. If the iteration parameter
of PBKDF2 is chosen high enough, computing cost will
remain too expensive. On the other hand, if the iteration
parameter is chosen too high, the pseudonymization
process is too time-consuming and bulky. Ultimately, it
is critical that the hardware is secured against physical
theft and that IT systems are protected with standard
and up-to-date IT security measures against hijacking or
other control-gaining attacks. It seems highly advisable
to use a hardware security module to store the secret
key of the pseudonymization service. A high iteration
parameter for PBKDF2 and security measures against
physical theft and hijacking will provide effective security
against this threat.
Social engineering targeting the ombudsmen is a serious
threat. Preventive measures must primarily include, but
should not be limited to, educating the ombudsmen so
they are aware of their sensitive and critical role. An add-
itional technical measure is for them to apply a personal
identification number (PIN) or passphrase to protect their
secret private asymmetric keys. Both measures combined
provide reasonable protection against this threat.
Malicious service use is a possible threat to the method.
Repetitive, high frequency access to the pseudonymization
service by a specific machine in order to guess PID-PSN
relations must be denied. An authentication procedure to
gain access to the service will at least prohibit unauthorized
access. Repetitive service usage or abuse can be prevented
by a "Reverse Turing Test" (RTT) [41]. The test helps de-
termine if a machine or a human is trying to use theservice and will eventually block the attacking machine
from service use. A human is not fast enough to perform
a service abuse attack. Therefore, a RTT and authenti-
cation and authorization mechanisms are appropriate
security measures against this threat.
Malicious insiders are a threat that may not be
underestimated. Especially a sabotage of the pseudo
nymization system is a threat that must be addressed by
credible and loyal staff. Solely a two-step pseudo
nymization method yields protection against sabotage of
untrustworthy staff.
Further technical threats may apply for any actual im-
plementation of the pseudonymization method. In the




Transport Layer Security“ (TLS) establishes an en-
crypted connection between the service user and the
service to prevent threats by traffic interception. Man-
in-the-middle attacks are not addressed, because the
service is offered exclusively in a trusted institutional
intranet with appropriate authentication and autho-
rization mechanisms. Therefore, it is inaccessible to
external attackers trying to impersonate the service
users.
Database attacks with SQL injections are impossible.
Any data received by the service is encrypted and es-
caped by a database abstraction layer before it is stored
in the database.
The authors identified no other malicious code or at-
tempts to attack this software service.
Conclusions
With the method presented above investigators can ef-
ficiently solve data privacy problems and streamline
patient-centric research conducted in cooperation with
external institutions. The biunique link between pa-
tient and pseudonym facilitates data aggregation over
various data sources for translational research objec-
tives or data warehousing approaches. All things con-
sidered, our method provides a secure and applicable
approach for the complete circle of patient data
pseudonymization and de-pseudonymization in trans-
lational research projects. It will be a valuable tool for
personalized medicine projects – on the Heidelberg
campus and beyond.
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